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Abstract
Recent research in security shows a real need for contextual information in building highly adaptive
security systems. The need for such security for web services is fast becoming imperative. In this
paper, we review the main contributions in this domain. Based, on this study we present a glimpse
at the CoDiS project; a generic layer for the rapid prototyping of context-based security systems,
aiming at getting around the limitations of existing systems.
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1 Introduction
Security is now one of the main challenges that cross disciplines, it is applied
at diﬀerent levels: network level, application level, user level, etc. Security
is also a never-ending process that requires dynamic reconﬁguration of its
components in order to cope with the constantly changing requirements of
highly dynamic environments. Also, traditionally, security systems tend to
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prevent unauthorized access but there is no eﬀective way to deal with users’
”bad” intentions when they have the right credentials.
The problems discussed previously suggest the need for constraining ac-
tions with their respective context of occurrence. For example, an e-mail may
be relevant to user a while it is considered as a junk email for user b. Taking
context - here, the user’s proﬁle - into consideration by the spam ﬁlter is the
only way to resolve the conﬂict. More speciﬁcally, Web services are subject
to personalization because of the need of accommodating user preferences.
Securing such applications is itself subject to adaptive behavior according to
the security context.
In this paper, we review the main contributions on combining context
and security and discuss why this combination is of interest for web ser-
vices. Based, on this study, we draw a set of conclusions for which aim is
to identify limitations of previous contributions and to justify the need for a
generic framework for managing context-based security. A summary of the
CoDiS project (a generic framework for managing context-based security in
distributed systems) is presented. Section 2 details some relevant scenarios in
order to show why context is important for better security for web services.
Section 3 discusses previous contributions on using context in security systems
- as a general paradigm - and details limitations of previous contributions. The
CoDiS project is introduced in Section 4. Some frequently questions about
CoDiS are answered in Section 5. Section 6 concludes this paper.
2 Why Context is Important for Better Security for
Web services
Where traditional security is mainly based on the concept of roles and tasks
aﬀected to these roles, we argue that the integration of context into these
security solutions is a new step towards future more eﬀective security. We
discuss in the following the need for making security for web services a context-
based activity. Thus, and in order to illustrate the relevance of our approach,
we present two scenarios that justify the need for context in security for web
services.
2.1 Enforcing web services semantics or ﬁne-grained access control
Current applications are taking beneﬁt of the pervasive computing paradigm
which pushes computations from a computer into everywhere but in the same
time quickly increases complexity, openness, interconnection, and interdepen-
dence [1]. These properties have made these systems more vulnerable and
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diﬃcult to protect than ever and new types of security attacks based on mali-
cious behavior emerged. As an example of such attacks are those carried out
by intruders who possess legitimate access to the system and act within their
bounds of normal behavior, but who are actually abusing the system. For
example, consider a web services-based e-business application which oﬀers ac-
cess to a database containing business-related data. The major characteristic
of such a web service is to accept diﬀerent kinds of users (administrator, local
employees, remote clients, etc) logging from various locations. An operation
like update the database is legitimate for each type of users but performed
by a remote client on a weekend is suspicious and may harm the system. In
these cases, the security of the web service must conform to its speciﬁc se-
mantics. These semantics are dependant on a set of contextual information
such as time, number of performed operations, interaction history, etc. More
complex scenarios may be deﬁned and more high level input may inﬂuence
these scenarios. Contextual information must then be taken into account in
deﬁning the ﬁne-grained access policy.
2.2 Determining security levels in heterogeneous applications
Heterogeneous networks are widely available and they provide a platform for
web services interactions to take place. Theses networks have many diﬀerent
properties such as transmission speed, communication media (RF, Infrared,
Microwave, etc), connectivity, bandwidth, range, etc. Moreover, many types
of computing devices are widely used and they have diverse capabilities. Addi-
tionally, exchanged information between web services and their clients (users,
other web services) range from simple text messages to video streams. Each
type of information requires the use of a speciﬁc security protocol in order to
ensure integrity for example. To secure this diverse environment, we should
adapt several security levels dynamically according to the diverse networks
and computing devices used to interact with web services, where adaptability
is based on the context of use. In this speciﬁc example, context helps enforcing
availability which is one of the main security goals as stated in [2].
3 Context-Based Security as a General Paradigm
3.1 Related Contributions
The literature on combining context and security mainly concentrates on
context-based RBAC (Role-Based Access Control). Primarily, these contri-
butions aim at extending the traditional RBAC model by integrating a set of
constraints. In this perspective, Masone [6] designed and implemented RDL
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(Role-Deﬁnition Language), a simple programming language to describe roles
in terms of context information. RDL has been designed for simplicity of use
and extensibility. A similar work is described in [7]. McDaniel in [8] proposes
an extended form of authorization policies. In this extended form, conditions
corresponding to context are expressed using programs rather than expressions
deﬁned over a ﬁxed set of attributes such is the case in most contemporary
systems.
Georgiadis et al. integrate their team-based access control (TMAC) with
contextual information [9] which results in a system called C-TMAC. The
TMAC model aims at providing an access control model that supports collab-
orative activity being accomplished by teams of users. C-TMAC is a hybrid
access control model that takes advantage of role-based permission assignment
of RBAC and yet provides the ﬂexibility for ﬁne-grained activation of permis-
sions for individual users on individual object instances. This ﬁne-grained
access control is dictated by a set of constraints (or context). For example,
in a healthcare setting a doctor may have the permission to prescribe cer-
tain medications. However, the doctor should not be allowed to prescribe for
anyone. Rather, he/she should be allowed to prescribe only for the patient’s
he/she is taking care of.
An interesting work by Covington et al. in [4] and [5] describes an approach
to design security services that incorporate the use of security-relevant ”con-
text” in order to provide ﬂexible access control. The authors target intelligent
home environments such as the Aware Home [3]. In order to facilitate the
collection of environment variables and their associated values, this approach
makes use of the context toolkit [10] which aims at facilitating the develop-
ment and deployment of context-aware applications. Access policies are based
on environment roles [4] and encoded into the eXtensible Markup Language
(XML). In regards to combining context with a security service other than
access control, the eﬀorts are rarer. It is worth mentioning the work by Pier-
son et al. in [11] which introduces context-agile encryption as a technique
to provide a diﬀerent encryption (in terms of key lengths, type of encryption
algorithm, etc) according to the applications needs and to hardware capabili-
ties. For example, some web services in high speed communication networks
may be able to tolerate long times to encrypt/decrypt information, but may
also need to protect that information for a long period of time. Other types of
web services, dealing with data that is sensitive while useful, but quickly be-
comes stale, might beneﬁt from short encryption/decryption times that may
accompany a less cryptographically robust algorithm.
Bellavista et al. propose a context-centric access control middleware for
mobile environments called COSMOS [12]. The middleware dynamically de-
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termines the contexts of mobile proxies, and rules the access to them based
on a set of data such as user proﬁles and system/user-level authorization
policies. COSMOS has been tested in the design and implementation of a
context-centric movie assistant which aim is to allow mobile users to ﬁnd
nearby cinemas and to exchange opinions about cinema characteristics such
as seat comfort, air conditioning, sound and screen resolution. Other contri-
butions can be found in [13], [14] and [15].
3.2 Limitations of Previous Contributions
Even if context has been used for some time in policies speciﬁcation, it is
rarely considered explicitly. As a consequence very few works beneﬁt from the
theories and tools already developed in the context-aware computing area in
order to model the needed contextual information. The other observation is
that most policies rely on location and date as contextual information and do
not include high level abstractions such as the network state and the user’s
interaction scheme with the system, and which could be of a great importance
in managing compositions of web services. When it is the case, it is not always
clear how people deal with these aspects. Additionally, even if the rule-based
representation is often adopted as an intuitive solution for modeling context,
such as in [4] and [6], it suﬀers from three main limitations. The ﬁrst one
is the diﬃculty to maintain such formalisms in case of complex systems to
secure. The second limitation is the diﬃculty to identify all the needed con-
textual information from the rule-based formalism which makes the context
management task awkward. The third main limitation is that it does not pro-
vide a convenient way for understanding the followed strategy of the policy
and makes the security management task cumbersome for security adminis-
trators. Decision trees are another way to structure the rules. However, the
ﬁne-grained nature of context leads to a combinatorial explosion of the trees
size. Thus, a more convenient way for modeling context should be applied.
Despite the advantages and limitations of previous systems, the context
existing systems relies on is static, which means that context-based security
actions are supposed to be known a priori as is the case in ancient expert
systems. The resulting security systems are thus, not able to learn from
previous failures.
Finally, and since previous systems rely on speciﬁc applications, there is no
generic software solution that enjoys reusability and extensibility features and
that may serve as a platform for building diﬀerent domain-speciﬁc context-
based security systems such as the ones for web services.
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4 A Glimpse at CoDiS: A Generic Layer for the In-
tegration of Context-Based Security in Distributed
Systems
In order to respect the workshop’s number of pages limit, note that this section
is intended to introduce the CoDiS project in a concise manner. Thus, we don’t
emphasize on technical details that may be found in [17].
Based on what we have seen in the previous Section, our motivations to
develop the CoDiS project are to satisfy this main set of objectives:
(i) to lay down the minimal foundations of a generic framework for the rapid
prototyping of context-based security systems with a focus on the soft-
ware architecture. Generic means to provide the core architecture that
can be easily extended or customized to build more speciﬁc applications
such as web services,
(ii) to decouple context acquisition and management from context modeling
and context usage,
(iii) to provide an easy way for switching between diﬀerent context-based
policy modeling techniques,
(iv) to support the dynamic aspect of contextual information,
(v) support easy modiﬁcations of context-based security policies.
CoDiS stands for context-based security in distributed systems. The aim of
this project is not to target a speciﬁc security problem such as context-based
access control, but rather to provide a generic implementation of a context-
based security system that may be used in any security infrastructure highly
dependent on contextual information. CoDiS is the realization and evolution
of the ﬁrst sketch of the project presented in the Context’03 conference (see
[16]).
We focus more on the implementation of a security context including its ac-
quisition, storage, representation, modeling and integration within a pervasive
environment.
The current implementation of CoDiS is a pattern-oriented framework for
context acquisition, representation and modeling speciﬁcally dedicated to se-
curity systems. Figure 1 illustrates the overall architecture of the framework.
Two main modules are shown:
(i) The context bucket is responsible for context lookup, storage and provi-
sion.
(ii) The context engine is responsible for context representation (aggrega-
tion, composition and interpretation) and for context modeling. The last
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task is performed in order to map each security context with its corre-
sponding security actions. Figure 1 depicts the relationships between the
two modules, and shows the diﬀerent interactions between them in order
to provide context-based security to distributed resources served by web
services.
4.1 CoDiS design principles
CoDiS has been designed following a set of guidelines with an aim to support
a generic layer for the rapid prototyping of context-based security systems.
The discussion of the in-depth software architecture of CoDiS is out of scope
of this paper and will not be discussed here; however, we refer the interested
reader to [17] for a more detailed discussion.
Our concern for CoDiS software quality, however, suggests satisfying a set
of design principles. The following sections detail each one of these principles.
4.1.1 Object-oriented framework design
The CoDiS architecture is composed of distinct parts each one packaging either
the core parts, or the customizable parts of the architecture that are frequently
extended in order to ﬁt within applications needs.
This requirement aims at reducing software complexity and is satisﬁed
using (a) a layered architecture and (b) a pattern-oriented design. Figure 2
shows a sample example; a simpliﬁed class diagram of the context representa-
tion module where core parts of the architecture emerge from the customizable
parts (speciﬁc contextual entries, speciﬁc interpreters of contextual entries).
The upper layer deﬁning the core part of the architecture is designed following
a well known design pattern; the composite (see [17] page 163).
4.1.2 Technology independence
This design principle aims at isolating the code related to a speciﬁc technol-
ogy from the core packages of the framework. The distributed nature of our
architecture requires the use of some protocols and mechanisms in order to
exchange messages and information. Instead of reinventing the wheel, we in-
vestigated many technologies oﬀering these capabilities. The current version
of CoDiS makes use of the discovery and communication protocols of the Jini
technology [19] in order to support context discovery and gathering. Jini capa-
bilities are assembled in a speciﬁc package and its corresponding mechanisms
are separated from the core architecture as much as possible in order to make
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Fig. 1. The overall architecture of CoDiS
updating the technology easy to perform.
4.1.3 Supporting the dynamicity of security contexts
On the other hand, since the framework is intended to be generic and customiz-
able for diﬀerent scenarios, the main particularities of CoDiS is the support for
the dynamic aspect of security contexts. The need for the support of context
dynamicity is justiﬁed by the following; a security context can be built during
a lap of time (for example in the case of access control) or it can be built only
after a longer period (for example when a security context corresponds to the
detection of abnormal behaviors in a secure building, where this behavior is
the accumulation of a set of speciﬁc actions performed during a longer period
of time).
After reviewing the main context modeling techniques [20], we retained
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Fig. 2. A simpliﬁed version of the context representation module: a framework approach
contextual graphs [21] as a modeling approach for context-based security
policies 3 . In both cases - discussed earlier - contextual graphs policies provide
an explicit support for context dynamicity which allows period-independent
construction of security contexts. Thus, oﬀering a convenient way for observ-
ing the evolution of security contexts.
Contextual graphs-based policies contain exactly one input and one output,
and a general structure of spindle. A path from the input to the output
of the graph represents a practice. Contextual graphs provide a context-
based representation of a task execution. More clearly, they express the set of
multiple alternatives (practices) to execute a task. An alternative is executed
among the others according to the current context.
Figure 3 illustrates an example contextual graphs policy that manages ﬁne-
grained access control to healthcare records in a hospital served by services.
Records are stored in a database. The hospital hosts a distributed environ-
ment that allows accessing the records from remote terminals by invoking the
3 CoDiS is designed in a way that it seamlessly accepts the inclusion of any new model-
ing approach of security policies. Contextual graphs have been retained for the reasons
mentioned in the paper.
G. Kouadri Mostéfaoui, P. Brézillon / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 146 (2006) 85–100 93
C1
  treating 
physician?
C5
C2
C6
C3
C4
R6
R5
R3
R2 R1
role?
domain?
working hours?
domain?
domain?
c6.0 yes
c6.1 no
c2.0 no
c1.0 doctor
c1.1 nurse c5.0 emergency room
c5.1 hospital
c4.2 outside
c4.1 hospital
A2
A2 A4
A2
A2
A2
A2 A3
c4.0 emergency room
c2.1 yes
c3.0 emergency room
c3.1 hospital
A1
A2 A3
A1: username/password authentication
A2: enter health care record's code 
A3: log user's activity and 
       send notification to the treating physician
A4: encrypt communication
R4
Fig. 3. Fine-grained access control to healthcare records
appropriate web service. For sake of clarity, only a small part of the contextual
graph is represented in the ﬁgure.
Hospital staﬀ wishing to access a patient’s health care record ﬁrst invokes
the web service by authenticating herself as being a member of the staﬀ. Then,
depending on the role of the user (C1), additional contextual information infers
the decision of authorizing access to the record. For example, if the user is the
treating physician (C2.1), an additional password authentication is required
when the physician is connected from a terminal inside the hospital (C4.1).
This additional step is not required if the physician requests the record from
the emergency room (C4.0). In the case the physician requests access to
the record from a terminal outside the hospital, an additional operation is
performed in order to encrypt the communication between the two parties.
This is done due to the high sensitivity of the information contained in health
care records.
As one can observe, for a nurse, only two cases are possible in contrast to a
doctor (treating physician or not). A nurse can access the patient’s record
if the request to the web service is performed from an emergency room or
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if it is performed from a terminal inside the hospital. Requests made from
outside the hospital are not authorized. Unauthorized path are not shown
on the contextual graph. This is to allow specifying only safe paths in order
to perform a secure action and is commonly known as closed security policy
”which is not explicitly permitted is denied”.
Contextual graphs provide a clear representation of security policies and
of the constraints that condition their behavior. Security mechanisms and
security contextual information are expressed using a set of graph elements
see Figure 4. At a contextual element - represented by a circle - a diagnosis
is made in order to evolve a security context. For each security context a
set of security mechanisms are enforced. Security actions are represented by
rectangles. Recombination nodes, represented by black circles play the role of
a tie. More clearly, when reaching a recombination node, the security context
is degenerated which means that the needed actions have been already applied
and the context is no longer relevant. Arrowed lines represent parallel action
grouping; when two or more actions can be realized in parallel. Macro-actions
represented in the contextual graph by MAi are special cases of activities
reduced to a simple sequence of actions.
Contextual graphs distinguish between three types of context namely, con-
textual knowledge, proceduralized context and external knowledge. In order
to illustrate these three types of context, we consider a decision making pro-
cess, whose actions to activate depend on a set of contextual information. The
process is modeled using contextual graphs. Thus, contextual knowledge is
a subset of context that directly intervenes in the decision making process.
Moreover, only a subset of the contextual knowledge is used at a given step
in the decision making process, this is known as proceduralized context. The
remaining subset which includes information which is not relevant to the sit-
uation is called external knowledge.
Again, consider the example of Figure 4. The context of the action A3 in
the previous example is described in a ﬁxed and static way. Once the action
A3 is executed, the value C3.1 of C3 does not matter anymore. The contextual
element C3 leaves the proceduralized context at the recombination node R3 to
go back to contextual knowledge. Thus, the context of the action A8, which
follows the execution of the action A3, is described by:
• the proceduralized context: C1 with the value C1.1, and C2 with the value
C2.0, and
• the contextual knowledge: C3, C4, C5, C6, C7.
The context of the action A8 is also described in a ﬁxed and static way. It
diﬀers from the context of action A3 by the contextual element C3 that moved
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C4
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MA3
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MA5
A3
A1
MA1
MA2
A2
MA6
A7
A9
R3
R4
R6 R5
R7
R2
R1
c1.0
c1.1
c2.0
c2.1
c3.0
c3.1
c4.0
c4.1
c5.0
c5.1
c5.2
c6.0
c6.1
c7.0
c7.1
A8
A0
A10
Fig. 4. An example contextual graph
from the proceduralized context of the practice to the contextual knowledge.
The contextual knowledge and the proceduralized contexts of actions A3 and
A8 are diﬀerent, but the sum of the contextual knowledge and the procedu-
ralized context is constant at the level of the contextual graph. The dynamics
of the context appears at the practice level. The contextual knowledge and
the proceduralized context evolve during the application of a practice (along a
path). For example, consider the upper practice in Figure 4: A0, A4, A5, A9,
A10. Its context presents the following dynamic along the practice application
(each line of the Table 1 represents a step in the application of the practice,
a step corresponding to a change in the context): The movement inside the
context (and its dynamic from an outside viewpoint) arises from a contextual
element entering the proceduralized context by its instantiation at a contex-
tual node, or, conversely, the withdrawal of the instantiation of a contextual
element (becoming again a piece of contextual knowledge) at a recombination
node. The movement between the proceduralized context and the contextual
knowledge follows the rule ”last in, ﬁrst out.” Thus, two contexts having the
same contextual knowledge and proceduralized context (as at lines 2 and 4 of
the Table above) are diﬀerent by their history in the practice.
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L Context of Contextual knowledge Proceduralized context
1 A0 {C1, C2, C3, C4, C5, C6, C7} ∅
2 A4 {C3, C4, C5, C6, C7} {C1.1, C2.1}
3 A5 {C3, C4, C6, C7} {C1.1, C2.1, C5.0}
4 {C3, C4, C5, C6, C7} {C1.1, C2.1}
5 A9 {C3, C4, C5, C6, C7} {C1.1, C2.1}
6 {C2, C3, C4, C5, C6, C7} {C1.1}
7 A10 {C1, C2, C3, C4, C5, C6, C7} ∅
Table 1
Dynamics of the context along the path A0, A4, A5, A9, A10
4.1.4 Supporting incremental acquisition of practices
By their nature, contextual graphs-based policies support incremental acqui-
sition of practices. Contextual graphs have the capacity of evolving by accom-
modation and assimilation of practices. Generally, the new practice diﬀers by
few changes (an action instead of an existing one, the addition or lack of an ac-
tion). Then, the CxG system enters a phase of acquisition of the new practice
from the security administrator. The practice acquisition concerns the new
action to integrate and the contextual element that discriminates that action
with the previous one. The integration of the new practice requires either
the addition of a new branch on an existing contextual node (just before the
diverging part of the practice), or the introduction of a new contextual node
to distinguish the alternatives. In all the alternatives, the piece of contextual
knowledge to add must be instantiated.
5 Q & A about CoDiS
Due to the number of pages limit, some details have been omitted. This
Section is intended to answer the most frequently asked questions about CoDiS
in a short manner.
(i) How to obtain context to consider in contextual nodes?
Contextual nodes are diagnosis nodes where a speciﬁc alternative is se-
lected among a set of other alternatives according to the value of the
context. According to the application domain, context may be obtained
locally such as time of request or from a client such as his preferences
or through sensors such as the temperature of a room. The last type of
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context is obtained using an agent-based approach for context discovery,
collection and storage (see Figure 1, Context-bucket layer). Collected
information from diﬀerent sources may also be concatenated to form a
composite context.
(ii) What is the main added value of the framework compared to previous
work?
Compared to other works such as the Context Toolkit [10], and from a
software engineering perspective, CoDiS relies on design patterns and on
a software framework approach for building highly reusable and maintain-
able software architectures. Rather than being tied to a speciﬁc applica-
tion, CoDiS may be easily customized to manage any type of context and
can be used for the rapid prototyping of context-based security systems.
(iii) What in CoDiS is speciﬁc to security? Why isn’t CoDiS broader than
that?
Initially, CoDiS has been designed for security matters where context
should be taken into account. The choice of the policies modeling tech-
nique has been inspired by the need for handling the dynamic nature
of security and all the interactions of the CoDiS components are se-
cured. However, the generic approach for building the software architec-
ture makes it a good candidate for the rapid prototyping of context-based
systems in the broader sense.
6 Conclusion
”A law is made to be circumvented” this is what we learn in schools of laws.
Computer security hackers are not diﬀerent from criminals and operate by
getting around safe security contexts. Context-based security as we present
it is a radical approach to security and aims at systematically integrating
context in diﬀerent security services such as cryptosystems, access control
and adaptive authentication.
Web services are now subject to many research on their discovery, composi-
tion, self-coordination, personalization and security. Security for web services
is however, generally addressed through a set of security standards which are
sometimes competitive and overlapping. Currently, there are no deﬁnitive
guidelines for applying these standards, especially when context should be
taken into account.
We discussed in this paper context-based security as a general paradigm,
highlighted its relevance to security for web services and discussed the limita-
tions of previous work. The CoDiS project was motivated by the need for a
generic framework for the integration of contextual information into security
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solutions. It also aims at getting around limitations of previous contributions
by essentially (a) considering the dynamic aspect of security contextual infor-
mation, and (b) supporting incremental acquisition of practices. However, we
attract the reader attention to the main beneﬁt of CoDiS which is the support
for a global view of context-based security; rather than being limited to ac-
cess control, it provides a generic platform upon which customizable adaptive
security services can be built for emerging applications such as web services.
Many open issues still exist in adaptive security, the main ones are: dealing
with missing or unambiguous context, resolving conﬂicts in security policies
and automatic learning of context-based security policies.
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